This research brief provides a consolidated analysis of the quantifiable impacts stemming from heightened political and administrative scrutiny of the Australian Government’s Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF). The analysis finds that the formal request for a performance audit of the HAFF serves as a catalyst for significant, interconnected political and economic risks.

The investigation confirms that Senator Andrew Bragg submitted a formal request to the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) on 10 October 2025, seeking a performance audit into HAFF “availability payments”.¹ This action, and the public discourse surrounding it, generate two primary forms of risk. First, it creates measurable policy uncertainty that degrades the confidence of essential delivery partners. Commentary from the Housing Industry Association (HIA) and the Community Housing Industry Association (CHIA) confirms that such instability “impairs market confidence” and can “hobble strategic planning,” thereby reducing the velocity and credibility of the affordable housing pipeline.²

Second, the audit request is predicated on allegations of inefficient capital deployment, anchored by the verifiable claim of HAFF-funded projects costing up to “$1.7 million per home” in total availability payments over 25 years.¹ The injection of large-scale public expenditure at such cost points into a severely capacity-constrained construction market triggers a direct resource “crowding out” effect. The Australian construction sector faces a quantified workforce shortfall of over 116,700 workers required to meet national housing targets.⁴ In this environment, HAFF-driven demand competes for scarce labour and materials, inflating input costs for all market participants. This cost inflation directly widens the Residual Land Value (RLV) Gap, rendering an increasing number of private-market housing projects financially unviable and paradoxically constraining overall housing supply.

The analysis concludes that this finding is substantiated by a convergence of primary source documentation from the ANAO, direct commentary from principal industry bodies, and the application of established economic principles to the current state of the Australian construction market. The government’s response has been characterised by a lack of specific rebuttal to the cost allegations and an official reticence that has further fueled demands for scrutiny.

This section establishes the factual, verifiable basis of the audit request. It confirms the formal request and substantiates the specific figures that underpin the political and economic risk analysis later in this brief. The transformation of political claims into a formal, independent governance process represents a material escalation of risk for the HAFF program and its stakeholders.

Formal Audit Request Verification

• Event Confirmation: The primary event was a formal request submitted by Senator Andrew Bragg to the Auditor-General on 10 October 2025. The correspondence explicitly requests that the ANAO “undertake a performance audit into the Housing Australia Future Fund availability payments”.¹ This action serves as the focal point of the scrutiny.
• Prior Correspondence: This specific request followed a pattern of escalating inquiry. Senator Bragg had previously written to the ANAO on 3 July 2025, requesting a broader investigation into the HAFF’s financial performance for the period ending 30 June 2025.⁷ The Auditor-General’s office engaged with this initial request, providing a response on 31 July 2025 and further clarification on 17 September 2025, indicating a sustained dialogue between the Senator’s office and the nation’s chief audit institution.⁷
• Current Status: The 10 October 2025 request concerning “availability payments” is officially logged by the ANAO with the status “Under consideration“.¹ The Auditor-General’s office has acknowledged receipt and provided a response, which was published on 27 October 2025.⁸ Concurrently, a related but distinct performance audit titled “Design and delivery of the Housing Australia Future Fund” is listed by the ANAO as “in-progress“.¹ This dual-track scrutiny, one request under active consideration and one full audit already underway, confirms that the HAFF is subject to a significant and ongoing level of formal oversight by an independent statutory body. This elevation of the issue from the political arena into the administrative and legal machinery of government oversight transforms what could be dismissed as partisan criticism into a tangible, procedural governance risk that delivery partners and investors must factor into their long-term assessments.

Substantiation of Cited Figures and Claims

The credibility of the audit request and the potency of the associated political narrative are anchored in specific, verifiable figures cited in the Senator’s official correspondence. These figures create a powerful and easily understood narrative of inefficiency and cost escalation.

• The “$1.7 Million Per Home” Claim: The central allegation is directly substantiated in Senator Bragg’s 10 October 2025 letter. He explicitly references a media report from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) as the source for the key figures, quoting: “Four individual homes in outer Port Macquarie in New South Wales will receive availability payments worth a collective $1.7 million each over 25 years”.¹ The inclusion of this figure in a formal request to the Auditor-General lends it a weight and legitimacy that transcends typical media reporting, establishing it as the anchor point for the “excessive cost” narrative.
• The “Triple Original Estimates” Claim: The Senator’s letter frames the cost escalation by stating: “Given this media reporting reveals payments are, in some instances, more than triple that of original estimates, I believe it is appropriate that you exercise your powers…”.¹ This contextualizes the “$1.7 million” figure against a baseline, creating the narrative of a significant budget blowout and justifying the need for an audit.
• The Grattan Institute Baseline: The “original estimate” used as the benchmark is also identified within the Senator’s correspondence, which again quotes the media report: “Early estimates by the Grattan Institute, which proposed the idea, put the required top-up amount [availability payment] at around $250,000 per home”.¹ This baseline is consistent with the Grattan Institute’s own foundational analysis on the topic. A 2023 submission from the Institute notes that the “subsidy gap” for social housing is typically an “upfront capital contribution of about $300,000,” with estimates for the total upfront construction cost of a single social housing unit ranging from “$240,000 to $330,000”.⁹ This establishes the crucial benchmark against which the “$1.7 million” figure is measured, providing a simple and powerful metric that cuts through the complexity of the HAFF’s financial structure to create a compelling narrative of gross inefficiency.

This section connects the verified political and administrative scrutiny detailed above to its tangible impact on the confidence and operational tempo of housing delivery partners. The evidence demonstrates that policy instability and the threat of audits directly undermine the long-term certainty required for capital investment in housing, thereby negatively affecting the velocity of the development pipeline.

Industry Response to Political and Policy Instability

Key industry bodies, representing the builders and community housing providers essential for HAFF’s success, have explicitly stated that political and policy uncertainty is a direct impediment to housing delivery.

• Housing Industry Association (HIA) on Certainty: The HIA, representing residential builders, has directly addressed the need for political stability for the HAFF. HIA Managing Director Jocelyn Martin called for “bi-partisan support and a long term commitment from all sides of government to the HAFF that extends beyond a single election cycle”.¹⁰ She further articulated the direct operational consequence of instability, stating, “builders need confidence and certainty from all sides of government to make a long term to commitment to the HAFF given many companies have spent significant time and resources to enable them to deliver homes under the scheme”.¹⁰ This validates the premise that political conflict and the risk of policy change following an audit or election create a high-risk environment for businesses, discouraging investment.
• HIA on Uncertainty: In a separate but analogous context concerning potential tax changes, HIA’s Chief Economist Tim Reardon provided a clear causal link between policy debate and negative market outcomes. He warned that such discussions lead to “market uncertainty, distortions and a decline in confidence. This further impairs the supply of new homes”.² The principle is directly applicable: intense public scrutiny and the threat of an audit create the same “market uncertainty” that “impairs” the delivery of new housing supply.
• Community Housing Industry Association (CHIA) on Uncertainty: CHIA, the peak body for the non-profit community housing organisations (CHOs) that are primary HAFF partners, provides the most direct validation. In a submission regarding the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation (NHFIC), the precursor to Housing Australia, CHIA articulated the precise impact of funding uncertainty on its members: “CHOs need to be confident that NHFIC will be in a position to meet their demand for loan – uncertainty in this respect will hobble strategic planning and the ability to commit to new transactions that increasing supply”.³ This statement confirms that the risk of policy or funding changes, such as those that could result from a critical performance audit, directly paralyzes the strategic planning and investment decisions of the very organizations tasked with delivering HAFF projects.

The Economic Impact of Uncertainty on Housing Markets

The concerns voiced by industry are not merely anecdotal; they are supported by empirical economic research demonstrating a negative correlation between political uncertainty and housing market performance.

• Academic Validation: A 2023 study focusing on US housing markets provides a quantitative framework for this effect. The research found a “significant negative impact of state political uncertainty on local house price growth” and concluded that because housing markets are “susceptible to changes in the government’s regulatory and fiscal policies,” such uncertainty exerts a “nontrivial influence” on market activity.¹¹ This academic work provides a theoretical and empirical foundation for the claims made by HIA and CHIA, showing that the political risk surrounding the HAFF can be expected to have a tangible, negative impact on the housing sector.

The HAFF model is predicated on long-term partnerships, with “availability payments” often structured over a 25-year period.¹ For the government, this is a policy instrument; for a delivery partner, it represents a 25-year revenue stream against which they must secure financing and commit significant capital today. The introduction of intense scrutiny and a formal ANAO audit creates a profound asymmetry of risk. The government’s primary risk is political embarrassment or a need to reform the program. The delivery partner’s risk is financial and potentially existential. An audit could lead to changes in compliance requirements, payment structures, or even program continuity under a future government. Financiers will inevitably price this heightened risk into the cost of capital required for upfront construction, making projects more expensive or, in some cases, unviable. This dynamic directly reduces the velocity of the housing pipeline.

This section provides the quantitative core of the analysis, establishing a causal chain from the alleged inefficient deployment of HAFF capital to a tangible, negative economic outcome in the private housing market. It substantiates the argument that in a severely capacity-constrained environment, large-scale public spending “crowds out” private development and exacerbates the Residual Land Value (RLV) Gap.

The Constraint: Quantifying Construction Sector Incapacity

The foundational premise of the “crowding out” argument is that the Australian construction market is not an elastic environment capable of absorbing a major new demand shock without significant price impacts. Data from government and industry bodies provides overwhelming evidence of a deep and persistent capacity constraint, primarily driven by a critical shortage of skilled labour.

• Headline Shortfall: The most definitive data comes from BuildSkills Australia’s 2025 Housing Workforce Capacity Study. The report concludes that for Australia to meet the National Housing Accord’s ambitious target of 1.2 million new homes, the industry requires an additional 116,700 workers by 2029. This figure represents a 24% increase over and above “business-as-usual projections”.⁴ This single data point defines the magnitude of the systemic constraint.
• Immediate Need: The crisis is not a distant problem but an immediate one. BuildSkills Australia also reported an immediate need for 90,000 new tradespeople by the end of 2024, a target the industry was already falling “significantly short” of.¹² Other industry analysis projects a need for 90,000 additional workers by the end of 2025 ¹³, highlighting the acute nature of the shortage.
• Industry Confirmation and Compounding Factors: Master Builders Australia corroborates this reality from an operational perspective. A recent survey of its members revealed that 85% found it challenging to hire suitably qualified workers, with two-thirds identifying workforce shortages as the industry’s “most pressing issue”.¹² This labor crisis is compounded by a long-term decline in productivity. A report from the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) found that construction labor productivity grew by a mere 17% over the three decades to 2024, compared to 64% in the broader market sector.¹⁴ More acutely, the Queensland Productivity Commission identified a 9% decline in construction productivity since 2018, meaning the industry now “needs 9 per cent more labour than it did in 2018, to produce the same level of output”.¹⁵

Table 1: Construction Industry Labour Shortfall Projections (2025-2029)

The Mechanism: “Crowding Out” in a Constrained Market

The economic theory of the “crowding out effect” posits that increased government spending can reduce private sector investment.¹⁶ While often discussed in the context of financial markets and interest rates, the principle applies with greater force to the direct competition for finite physical resources.

In the capacity-constrained market established above, the HAFF’s injection of billions of dollars in public funds does not occur in a vacuum. It creates a new, large source of demand that competes directly with private developers for the same limited pool of skilled labour, carpenters, electricians, project managers, and essential materials.¹² This is a direct, physical resource crowding out, not a theoretical financial one. The inevitable consequence of multiple large buyers competing for scarce goods is price inflation. Reports from active markets like Brisbane already highlight “Rising labour costs due to increased demand” and “Material costs increasing by up to 25% this financial year” as key challenges.¹⁷ The HAFF, particularly if it is perceived as a price-insensitive buyer willing to fund projects at a premium (as the “$1.7 million” figure suggests), acts as a powerful accelerant for this input cost inflation across the entire sector.

The Impact: Exacerbation of the Residual Land Value (RLV) Gap

The final step in the causal chain is to connect this sector-wide cost inflation to the viability of private development projects. This is achieved through the concept of Residual Land Value.

• RLV Definition: The Reserve Bank of Australia provides a clear definition of RLV as the metric used by developers to determine what they can afford to pay for a development site. It is calculated as the “expected sales minus construction and related costs”.¹⁸ In essence, the RLV is what is left over to pay for the land and generate a profit after all other costs are accounted for. It is the fundamental measure of a project’s financial viability.¹⁹
• The Synthesis: The connection is direct and unavoidable.

1. The construction industry is operating at or beyond its capacity limits, with a severe labour shortage (Part A).
2. The HAFF injects a major new stream of public demand, competing for these scarce resources and driving up the cost of labour and materials for everyone (Part B).
3. According to the RLV formula, as “construction and related costs” rise, the residual amount available for land and profit must fall.
4. This erosion of the residual value widens the “viability gap”, the RLV Gap, between what a project costs to deliver and what the market will pay for the end product. This pushes an increasing number of private-market projects below the threshold of financial feasibility, causing them to be delayed or abandoned.²¹

The conclusion is that the alleged inefficient deployment of HAFF capital is not merely a matter of poor public finance; it is an active market distortion. By contributing to cost inflation, it “crowds out” more efficient private development, paradoxically reducing the overall potential supply of housing. Given that private developers are expected to deliver 97% of the homes required to meet the National Housing Accord target, this crowding-out effect poses a critical threat to Australia’s national housing goals.²³

This section documents the official counter-narrative from the government and its agencies. The response to the audit request and the cost-per-dwelling allegations has been characterised by a focus on broad policy objectives rather than specific rebuttals, and a reliance on commercial confidentiality that has, in turn, fueled further scrutiny.

Ministerial and Agency Position on Audit Request and HAFF Performance

• Housing Minister’s Response: The research yields no direct public statement from Housing Minister Julie Collins that specifically addresses the 10 October 2025 audit request into availability payments. Ministerial communications consistently frame the HAFF in terms of its broad ambitions, describing it as a “secure, ongoing pipeline of funding for social and affordable rental housing” and a central pillar of the government’s “ambitious housing reform agenda”.²⁴ When confronted in Parliament and the media about the slow pace of delivery and the fact that initial completions were acquisitions rather than new builds, the ministerial response has been to emphasise the time required to establish the fund and to pivot to other government housing initiatives.²⁶
• Treasurer’s Response: Similarly, Treasurer Jim Chalmers has not directly addressed the audit request or the specific cost allegations. His public statements position the housing challenge within the broader economic context of cost-of-living pressures and the national imperative to “build more homes for Australians”.²⁸ The Treasurer has, however, publicly acknowledged the difficulty in meeting the government’s overall 1.2 million homes target, particularly after internal Treasury advice, revealed through a Freedom of Information request, warned that the goal “will not be met” under current policy settings.³⁰
• Housing Australia’s Response: A comprehensive review of Housing Australia’s media releases and public statements reveals a NIL RETURN for any communication in or around October 2025 that directly addresses Senator Bragg’s audit request or the “$1.7 million per home” allegation.³² The agency’s public communications are focused on operational announcements, such as the signing of contracts for HAFF projects, the opening of funding rounds, and the administration of other government home ownership schemes.³²
• Official Secrecy: The lack of public response is compounded by an official policy of non-disclosure. Senator Bragg has publicly and repeatedly accused the government of a “commitment deeply to secrecy” regarding the HAFF’s financial arrangements.³³ He has stated that the government refuses to disclose the specific value of availability payments going to individual providers, citing “commercial reasons.” The Senator has labelled this justification “ridiculous” and “offensive,” arguing that the expenditure of public funds necessitates transparency.³³ This official opacity creates an information vacuum that allows the critical narrative to flourish and provides further justification for the formal scrutiny being pursued through the ANAO.

Justification of Per-Dwelling Costs

Public statements from ministers and Housing Australia officials contain no specific, direct justification for the “$1.7 million per home” figure associated with the Port Macquarie project. The government has not offered a detailed breakdown or a counter-figure to rebut the allegation.

The implied justification lies in the nature of the funding mechanism itself. The figures cited by critics represent the nominal total of “availability payments” spread over a 25-year term.¹ This long-term stream of payments is designed to cover not just the initial capital subsidy but also the ongoing gap between subsidised rents and operational costs, including maintenance, management, and financing, over the life of the asset. The actual upfront capital subsidy, when calculated on a net present value basis, would be a fraction of the nominal 25-year total. However, this complex financial explanation has not been effectively articulated in the public domain to counter the simpler and more alarming headline figure. This represents a significant communication failure, allowing a comparison between a 25-year nominal payment stream and a one-time upfront capital cost estimate to define the public debate.

Table 2: Comparative Per-Dwelling Cost Analysis

The evidence and analysis across the preceding sections confirm a clear and logical causal chain, linking the political scrutiny of the Housing Australia Future Fund to tangible, negative impacts on both the social housing pipeline and the broader private development market.

First, the formal audit request is a verified fact. Submitted on 10 October 2025 and now accompanied by an ongoing in-progress audit by the ANAO, it has successfully transitioned a political critique into a formal governance process. This creates a material risk for delivery partners, whose long-term financial commitments are predicated on policy stability. Direct testimony from the HIA and CHIA confirms that this environment of uncertainty impairs confidence, hobbles strategic planning, and ultimately threatens to delay or derail projects in the development pipeline.

Second, the economic risk is substantiated through a three-part synthesis. The Australian construction sector is demonstrably operating under a severe capacity constraint, defined by a critical and quantified labour shortage of over 116,700 workers. The injection of large-scale, and allegedly price-insensitive, HAFF expenditure into this constrained environment triggers a direct resource “crowding out” effect, inflating the costs of labour and materials for all market participants. This sector-wide cost inflation, when applied to the mechanics of Residual Land Value, directly compresses the viability of private-market developments. The widening RLV Gap makes private projects less feasible, paradoxically limiting the overall housing supply that the HAFF was intended to augment.

Finally, the government’s response, or lack thereof, has acted as an accelerant to these risks. The failure to provide a clear, specific rebuttal to the “$1.7 million per home” allegation has allowed a damaging narrative of inefficiency to take root. Furthermore, the reliance on “commercial-in-confidence” to shield payment details from public view has fostered suspicion and provided further justification for the very scrutiny the government seeks to avoid. This information vacuum has allowed critics to define the terms of the debate, solidifying the perception of the HAFF as an inefficient program, which in turn amplifies both the political risk for its partners and the economic distortions it creates in the market. The convergence of these factors validates the assessment of the HAFF’s dual negative impact.

1. Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF) availability payments …, accessed October 2025, https://www.anao.gov.au/work/request/housing-australia-future-fund-haff-availability-payments
2. Don’t impair market confidence with talk of more taxes, accessed October 2025, https://hia.com.au/our-industry/newsroom/economic-research-and-forecasting/2025/07/dont-impair-market-confidence-with-talk-of-more-taxes
3. Community Housing Industry Association … – Treasury.gov.au, accessed October 2025, https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-02/c2021-146247-chia.pdf
4. BuildSkills Jobs and Skills Council releases its 2025 workforce capacity study, accessed October 2025, https://cet.aigroup.com.au/news/blogs/2025/buildskills-jobs-and-skills-council-releases-its-2025-workforce-capacity-study/
5. Housing Workforce Capacity Study | BuildSkills Australia, accessed October 2025, https://buildskills.com.au/housing
6. Requests for audit | Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), accessed October 2025, https://www.anao.gov.au/work-program/requests?items_per_page=120&page=0
7. Performance audit of the Housing Australia Future Fund – Australian National Audit Office, accessed October 2025, https://www.anao.gov.au/work/request/performance-audit-of-the-housing-australia-future-fund
8. Requests for audit | Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), accessed October 2025, https://www.anao.gov.au/work-program/requests
9. Pass the HAFF | Grattan Institute, accessed October 2025, https://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/HAFF_submission_Aug_2023.pdf
10. Industry needs funding certainty and long term commitment to HAFF, accessed October 2025, https://hia.com.au/our-industry/newsroom/industry-policy/2025/02/industry-needs-funding-certainty-and-long-term-commitment-to-haff
11. State Political Uncertainty and Local Housing Markets – Evidence from U.S. Mid-term Gubernatorial Elections* – American Economic Association, accessed October 2025, https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2023/program/paper/dHaAfTFn
12. Labour Shortage In The Construction Industry | The Access Group, accessed October 2025, https://www.theaccessgroup.com/en-au/construction/resources/labour-shortage-in-the-construction-industry/
13. The Depth of the Crisis: Understanding Australia’s Construction Labour Shortage in 2025, accessed October 2025, https://conplant.com.au/news/understanding-australias-construction-labour-shortage-in-2025/
14. Size Matters: Why Construction Productivity Is So Weak – Reserve Bank of Australia, accessed October 2025, https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/other-confs/abs-and-rba-joint-conferences/2025/pdf/abs-rba-conference-2025-wilson-brooks.pdf
15. Interim report – Opportunities to improve productivity of the construction industry, accessed October 2025, https://www.qpc.qld.gov.au/docs/construction-productivity/Interim%20Report%20-%20Opportunities%20to%20improve%20productivity%20of%20the%20construction%20industry.pdf
16. Crowding Out Effect: How Government Spending Impacts Private …, accessed October 2025, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crowdingouteffect.asp
17. Brisbane Construction Industry Faces Critical Labor Shortage: 2025 – Cassaform, accessed October 2025, https://www.cassaform.com.au/articles/brisbane-construction-industry-faces-critical-labor-shortage-for-2025/
18. Appendix B: Comparison to Residual Land Valuations | RDP 2020 …, accessed October 2025, https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2020/2020-04/appendix-b.html
19. Real Estate Development Feasibility and Hurdle Rate Selection – MDPI, accessed October 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2075-5309/14/4/1045
20. Australian Transport Assessment and Planning Guidelines O8 Land-use benefits of transport initiatives, accessed October 2025, https://www.atap.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/o8-land-use-benefits.pdf
21. City of Melbourne Amendment C376 Economic Assessment – AWS, accessed October 2025, https://hdp-au-prod-app-com-participate-files.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/3117/2853/3050/Expert_Evidence_Statement_-_Economics_-_City_of_Melbourne_Amendment_C376_Economic_Assessment.pdf
22. Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF) and the National Housing Accord Facility: The opportunities for private developers (Copy) – Development Directive, accessed October 2025, https://www.developmentdirective.com.au/news/housing-australia-future-fund-haff-and-the-national-housing-accord-facility-the-opportunities-for-private-developers-jy2xg-2p849
23. Housing crisis requires private sector developers to double output – but how?, accessed October 2025, https://www.apimagazine.com.au/news/article/housing-crisis-requires-private-sector-developers-to-double-output-but-how
24. Start of Housing Australia Future Fund | Treasury Ministers, accessed October 2025, https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/julie-collins-2022/media-releases/start-housing-australia-future-fund
25. Housing Australia Investment Mandate set to unlock more homes – Treasury Ministers, accessed October 2025, https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/julie-collins-2022/media-releases/housing-australia-investment-mandate-set-unlock-more
26. Minister Collins doorstop at Parliament House, accessed October 2025, https://formerministers.dss.gov.au/19728/minister-collins-doorstop-at-parliament-house/
27. Hansard – Senate 28/08/2025 Parliament of Australia, accessed October 2025, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansards/28841/&sid=0193
28. Cost of living help and a future made in Australia | Treasury Ministers, accessed October 2025, https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/jim-chalmers-2022/media-releases/cost-living-help-and-future-made-australia
29. 2025–26 Budget Speech, Parliament House, Canberra | Treasury Ministers, accessed October 2025, https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/jim-chalmers-2022/speeches/2025-26-budget-speech-parliament-house-canberra
30. Raise taxes to fix budget, 1.2m homes won’t be built Labor told by Treasury | ABC NEWS, accessed October 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Z-yMxosz8
31. Jim Chalmers insists Labor can meet target of 1.2m new homes despite department warning | Housing | The Guardian, accessed October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/jul/14/jim-chalmers-defends-labor-housing-targets-after-treasury-briefing-information-released-to-abc
32. Media | Housing Australia, accessed October 2025, https://www.housingaustralia.gov.au/media
33. Hansard – Senate 3/09/2025 Parliament of Australia, accessed October 2025, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansards/28850/&sid=0172